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The Chinese government intervenes extensively to promote industrialization, relying on a 
range of policy instruments.  In this paper, we examine three such policies that affect the 
magnitude and direction of the spillovers from foreign direct investment.  These policies are the 
ownership structure of the enterprise system, including direct state-ownership and 
accommodations to FDI, and tariffs and tax subsidies, both of which serve the purpose of 
promoting foreign investment in key sectors.  In this paper, we extend our understanding of 
how each of these policies – state and foreign ownership, tariffs and trade reform, and tax 
incentives – operates through intra- and/or inter-industry FDI spillovers to affect the performance 
of Chinese-based manufacturing firms.     
Incorporating these policy instruments into the analysis of FDI spillovers addresses two 
objectives.  The first is to assess the effectiveness of different forms of industrial policy, 
including their indirect effects.  A second purpose is to control for possible bias associated with 
econometric estimates of FDI spillovers resulting from the omission of industrial policies that are 
systematically correlated with FDI clusters.  These FDI clusters include both within- industry 
clusters spurring horizontal spillovers or between-industry FDI clusters leading to vertical 
upstream or downstream effects.  Given the likely interactions of industrial policy and FDI, 
studies of FDI spillovers should attempt to control for the direct and indirect impacts of these 
policies. 
 The period between 1998 and 2007 witnessed many policy shifts as China altered and 
experimented with a range of industrial policies.  Tens of thousands of state-owned enterprises 
changed ownership or were liquidated.  At the end of 2001, China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  Average tariffs on manufacturing in China, which stood at 
4 
 
43 percent in 1994, following China’s accession to the WTO fell to 9.4 percent by 2004.4  FDI 
inflows accelerated, and by the end of the period China was one of the top destinations for 
foreign investment.  Over these ten years, many foreign investors in China faced much lower 
corporate tax rates than domestic enterprises.  Before 2008, foreign investors received a 15 
percent corporate tax rate while domestic enterprises faced a regular 33 percent corporate tax 
rate
5
.  This policy of promoting foreign invested firms and other favored firms was only 
discontinued in 2008.  It is difficult to imagine that these substantial changes have not, both 
directly and through their impact on FDI, affected the productivity performance of Chinese 
manufacturing.    
Other countries have received extensive FDI within the context of state- and foreign- 
ownership, tariff protection, and tax incentives.  However, probably no country to the extent of 
China has sponsored such an active range of industrial policies in combination with as 
heterogeneous a group of enterprise types.  China’s enterprise system includes an extensive 
system of state-owned enterprises, including those with a mix of state and foreign ownership; 
foreign-owned firms distinguish overseas investment from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
versus that from other areas including the OECD countries.  Patterns of tariff protection and 
liberalization, as well as the fabric of tax subsidies, are likely to be interconnected with patterns 
of enterprise ownership.   
Our results suggest that the trade reforms and tax policies adopted by China during the 10 
years of our sample period increased the gains from incoming FDI.  Our first result is that both 
tariff reductions and China’s entry into the WTO increased the gains from vertical FDI spillovers.  
                                                        
4 Naughton (2007), Ch. 16. 
5 However, the government adjusted this preferential policy in 2008. Beginning Jan 1, 2008, the following corporate tax policy 
for foreign-invested firms came into effect: foreign-invested firms that previously received preferential corporate tax rates would 
return to the regular tax rate within 5 years. In 2008, the tax rate increased from 15% to 18%; in 2009, the rate further increased 
to 20%; in 2010, the corporate tax rate rose to 22% and finally reached 25% in 2012.  
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By interacting measures of tariff reform and WTO entry with our foreign investment measures, 
we find significant increases in the benefits from FDI after trade reform, especially for backward 
linkages.  Second, we find that foreign investors who received corporate tax breaks transmitted 
larger externalities to domestic enterprises.  Third, the evidence suggests that pairing foreign 
firms with SOEs led to gains for SOE partners that generally exceeded gains for other domestic 
firms. 
We suggest a set of reasons for the robustness of downstream FDI and backward spillovers; 
some of these are general, while some are specific to China.  Recent analyses of vertical FDI 
spillovers for other countries (see the survey in Harrison and Rodriguez Clare (2010)) have 
emphasized the importance of backward linkages from domestic suppliers to foreign buyers.  
Strong backward linkages were present in studies of Lithuania, Great Britain, and Indonesia, for 
example.  Other conditions are specific to China: formal and informal “technology for markets” 
programs have emphasized the provision of knowledge in exchange for market access in a 
variety of sectors such as automobiles where the acquisition of knowledge by local suppliers is a 
key constraint.    
While the focus of this paper is on the interaction between FDI spillovers and domestic 
policies, the stand-alone results for ownership and spillover effects are themselves of interest.  
Horizontal spillovers, which measure spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in the same 
sector, are robust only for firms with foreign partners and for SOEs.  Forward linkages, which 
include positive spillovers from upstream foreign suppliers to downstream firms, are generally 
significant.  Backward linkages, which measure linkages from domestic suppliers to foreign 
buyers, are largest in magnitude and significant once we control for trade policies and their 
interaction with FDI. 
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In addition to measuring the impact of formal tariff reductions on final goods and on inputs, 
we also explore the impact of China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001.  Tariff changes do 
not capture the important shift in market access to foreign markets induced by China’s WTO 
entry.  Tariff changes also do not capture other changes associated with WTO membership, such 
as reductions in non-tariff barriers and domestic content laws.  To capture this, we also explore 
the impact of a WTO dummy on firm performance.  For all enterprises except the foreign 
invested firms, WTO entry was associated with a very large and significant improvement in 
performance.  The evidence suggests that market access to foreign markets was a more 
important driver of firm performance, as measured by TFP growth, than internal tariff reductions. 
We also explore the differential impact of tax subsidies bestowed on foreign investors.  If 
the Chinese government correctly targets, through tax concessions, those sectors and firms with 
greater potential for creating spillovers, we would expect stronger linkages associated with tax 
breaks.  We do, in fact, find statistically significant evidence of stronger FDI productivity 
externalities associated with sectors and firms that received tax breaks. 
We examine these connections in the five sections that follow.  Section II reviews the 
existing literature and Section III lays out the analytical framework of the paper.  Our data set, 
described in Section IV, consists of a comprehensive panel of firm-level data constructed from 
extensive annual firm surveys covering the period 1998-2007.  We use these data to implement 
our econometric strategy described in Section V.  Section VI describes and analyzes the key 
results of the analysis, and Section VII presents the concluding comments.   
 
 
II. Literature Review 
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China’s transition from a highly centralized, monopolistic trade regime with extensive 
import and export controls began at the end of 1978.  Figure 1 shows that the share of trade 
(exports plus imports) in GDP for China was less than 10 percent in the 1970s, but increased 
rapidly as the regime liberalized.  By the mid-1990s, the share of trade in GDP had reached 
over 40 percent.  Naughton (1996) documents the transition to a more open trade and foreign 
investment regime from 1978 onwards.
6
  One important feature of the reforms was its dualistic 
nature, similar to other types of dual track reforms introduced in China the last several decades.  
The dualism was characterized by a rapidly expanding system of export processing operating 
alongside a fairly protected domestic economy. 
In 1980 the government established the first four Special Economic Zones and extended 
these to 14 coastal cities in 1984 (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang, 2012).  Foreign 
investment inflows were encouraged to bring in capital, and the government began a policy of 
sometimes explicit and other times implicit bargaining to grant domestic market access to foreign 
companies in exchange for technological know-how.  Duty free importation was also allowed 
outside special zones, particularly for targeted foreign firms.   
As Figure 1 shows, beginning in the mid-1990s China’s integration into the global economy 
accelerated, with trade growing to 70 percent of GDP right before the financial crisis in 2007.  
One factor that has facilitated the continued growth in trade is the spectacular rise in inward 
foreign investment, which is documented in Figure 2.  Major reforms to encourage incoming 
foreign investment were introduced in 1986 and 1991.  Inducements to foreign investors 
included duty drawbacks, tariff exemptions, subsidies, infrastructure provisions, and tax 
                                                        
6 Elements of the trade and investment reforms included exchange rate devaluation, relaxing rules on currency convertibility, 
increasing the number of foreign trade corporations from twelve national monopolies to many thousands, reducing non-tariff 
barriers, and gradually reducing tariffs and freeing up import prices. 
8 
 
holidays. 
Numerous papers have examined the existence and magnitude of FDI spillovers in China.  
Jefferson and Miao (2014) review much of the literature and try to explain the lack of 
consistency regarding the research findings concerning China’s FDI spillovers.  Their central 
finding, resulting from their review of 16 Chinese FDI spillover papers, is that the multiplicity of 
data sources and research methodologies render impossible an effective comparison of the results.  
These differences include the use of value added versus gross output measures of factor 
productivity; some analyses are derived with the assumption of constant returns to scale; others 
are not.  Moreover, while the earlier papers focused largely on horizontal, intra-industry 
spillovers, more recent papers have included vertical, forward and backward, as well as 
horizontal spillovers.  Different papers invariably impose different controls.  Some papers 
control, often in different ways, for China’s extensive set of ownership types; some seek to 
identify the channels through which FDI might affect host firm productivity, such as labor 
market movement and trade; most do not.  With respect to econometric strategy, some use 
industry, region or province, or firm-level fixed effects; others do not.  These are but some of 
the differences that Jefferson and Miao identify which frustrate efforts to arrive at robust 
consensus conclusions regarding the body of research on Chinese FDI spillovers.
7
  By 
                                                        
7
 Two of the papers reviewed by Jefferson and Miao (2014) use the above size firm-level data set and incorporate both 
horizontal and vertical FDI spillover possibilities, both of which are used in this paper.  These papers are Lin, Liu, and Zhang 
(2009) and Girma, Gong, and Gord (2009).  The samples drawn from those papers both use shorter time horizons than we use in 
this paper.  Lin et al (2009) distinguish between spillover effects originating from investment from Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan (HMT) and foreign, non-HMT investment.  In either case, they find strong and robust vertical spillover effects on both 
state-owned firms and non-state firms.  Girma et al (2009) examine the impact of FDI spillovers, both horizontal and vertical, 
on new product innovation rather than TFP.  They conclude that FDI clusters have negative impacts on innovation in SOEs.  
However, for a subsample of the SOEs – those that export, invest in human capital or R&D, or have prior innovation experience 
(i.e., the more technologically advanced SOEs) – Girma et al find that FDI has positive impacts on their innovation activity.  A 
third paper by Hu and Jefferson (2002) that looks only at horizontal spillovers finds that SOEs are more susceptible to negative 
spillover effects than non-SOEs.  Thus, while there is no common core findings, stitching the various findings together, this 
slice of the literature concludes that the spillover impacts across different ownership types are varied, depending on the direction 
of the spillover.  SOEs, particularly those that are more technologically sophisticated, are likely to benefit from vertical FDI 
spillovers.  Less technologically advanced SOEs appear not to benefit from horizontal spillovers.   
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introducing tariff and tax policy into the analysis, this paper only extends the variety of research 
approaches.  However, we will be able to compare FDI spillover impacts on different ownership 
types with such attention given in other papers.   
None of the papers in the Jefferson and Miao review controls for tariffs or tax subsidies.  
However, outside of China, we do find an extensive literature that explores the role of trade 
liberalization and its impact on productivity for both developed and developing countries.  
While this literature is reviewed in detail in Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), we discuss 
some of the most relevant papers here.  Recent papers on trade liberalization include Trefler 
(2004) for Canada and Bustos (2011) for Argentina.  Trefler (2004) explores the impact of tariff 
reductions on Canadian manufacturing after the passage of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  Trefler finds that in the short run employment fell on average 5 percent 
and up to 12 percent in the most heavily affected sectors that had large tariff declines.  He also 
finds large increases in Canadian labor productivity as a result of the tariff reductions, of 14 to 15 
percent.  Trefler concludes that parts of the labor force experienced significant short term losses 
despite the longer term efficiency gains, and that this explains in part the public’s disaffection 
with trade reform.   Bustos (2011) uses a similar event: the reduction of tariffs under the 
MERCOSUR agreement, to explore the impact on Argentina’s firms.  She finds that firms 
facing tariff cuts increased their investments in both process and product technological 
upgrading.   
One new area of research seeks to disentangle the effects of input and output tariffs.  
Illustrative of this research is Amiti and Konings (2007), who use Indonesian manufacturing 
census data to show that the effect of reducing input tariffs significantly increases productivity, 
and that this effect is much higher than that of reducing output tariffs.  New research on India 
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by Nataraj (2011) as well as Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010a, 2010b), and 
Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) also shows that tariff reductions on both inputs and final goods 
are associated with productivity improvements. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) estimate the 
impact on listed firms of the reductions in input and output tariffs on total factor productivity 
(TFP) in India.  Like Amiti and Konings, they find that while reducing output tariffs raised TFP, 
reductions in input tariffs had an even bigger positive impact on measured TFP.  Like this recent 
body of tariff literature, this paper distinguishes between the implications of input and final 
goods tariffs on FDI spillovers. 
The interaction between trade policy and foreign investment flows has long been of 
research interest to scholars.  The classic reference on the interaction between tariffs and FDI is 
Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), who formalize the argument proposed by Jagdish Bhagwati 
(1973) that incoming capital induced by high tariffs can lead to immiserizing growth and a fall in 
welfare. Foreign capital inflows exacerbate the production and consumption distortions created 
by tariffs, and by repatriating the profits abroad foreign firms further reduce domestic welfare.  
Further studies have suggested evidence of “tariff-jumping” FDI, suggesting that foreign firms 
are attracted to protected domestic markets. While these early studies do not directly speak to the 
effects of backward spillovers in the presence of tariff distortions, they do suggest that tariffs 
interact in a harmful way with foreign firms. 
We are not aware of any studies which measure the differences in foreign investment 
spillovers across different levels of corporate tax rates.  There are also very few published 
studies of the impact of trade reforms on firm productivity in China.  One exception is Yu 
(forthcoming) on the linkages between output tariffs, input tariffs, and processing trade in China.  
Yu merges the Chinese census data used in this paper with firm-specific measures of final goods 
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and imported intermediate input trade to calculate firm-specific final goods and input tariffs.  
Yu finds that contrary to the results for Indonesia in Amiti and Konings (2007) and Topalova and 
Khandwal (2011), reductions in final goods tariffs increased productivity more for processing 
firms than did reductions in intermediate input tariffs.  Yu attributes this result in large part to 
the fact that firms under the processing trade regime were exempted from tariffs on intermediate 
inputs. 
Existing research on the link between tax subsidies and FDI is largely focused on countries 
and regions apart from China.  In their review, Morisett and Pirnia (1999) conclude “incentives 
will neither make up for serious deficiencies in the investment environment, nor generate the 
desired externalities.”  The authors find that, more important than tax preferences, investors are 
most attentive to “fundamental factors like economic conditions and political climate.”  Only 
when such factors are “more or less equal” across locations that offer a similar range of 
fundamental factors, such as with the U.S. or within the E.U., tax policy may exert a significant 
impact.  While the authors review no studies relating to China, they do find that firms operating 
in several similar country settings may exploit different tax regimes.   
Solis (2011) reviews the literature on developing country subsidies for multinational 
corporations.  He examines the link between subsidized FDI and six critical development 
factors: competitiveness, social development, democracy, governance, and entrepreneurship and 
finds no coherent or sustainable justification for FDI subsidies.  While Solis does not include 
any empirical reference to China’s experience with FDI, he does suggest that it may differ from 
that of Latin America with respect to the practice of the Chinese government in imposing greater 
conditionality on FDI and also having the ability to capture some of the rents from FDI.   
Summarizing, we find that FDI may affect firms of different ownership types, depending 
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upon the direction of the spillovers and the capacity of the recipient firms to absorb the impact of 
the spillovers, whether technology, competition, or some combination of the two.  While much 
of the FDI spillover literature focuses on the impacts of FDI on different ownership types in 
China, we find no prior literature on ways in which tariffs and taxes in China have affected the 
nature of FDI spillovers in that country.      
 
III. Basic Framework 
 
To examine the impact of trade policy and foreign investment promotion, we employ a two 
stage procedure.  In the first stage we estimate a three-input gross-output production function 
by subsector for firm subsamples representing two ownership types: (1) all firms and (2) 
domestic firms with zero foreign investment that are not classified as SOEs.  We use the 
estimated factor output elasticities for labor, capital, and materials to construct measures of total 
factor productivity (TFP) for each firm and year.  In the second stage, we regress the dependent 
variable, lnTFP, on the relevant FDI cluster, policy variables, and controls.   
  The first-stage production function is: 
lnYijt  = α0 + αLlnLijt + αKlnKijt + + αMlnMijt + μijt,  (1) 
 
 
where i = the firm in sector j and in year t = 1998-2007.  
For the purpose of estimating the first-stage production function, we employ the Olley-Pakes 
method to get unbiased estimates of the factor output elasticities.  China’s Input-Output table 
divides China’s manufacturing industry into 71 sectors (as shown in Table 2).  Our firm-level 
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survey data include 4-digit level industry classifications.  Hence, to construct the intra- and 
inter-industry spillover variables (as for constructing the input tariff variables), we need to 
aggregate the 4-digit classifications up to 71 sectors.
8
  
When applying with Olley-Pakes estimation procedure, all output and input variables are 
deflated by their corresponding price indices.  We deflate the output value by the 29 individual 
sector ex-factory price indices of industrial products.
9
  Capital is defined as the net value of 
fixed assets, which is deflated by a uniform fixed assets investment index, and labor is a physical 
measure of the total number of employees.  Intermediate inputs purchased by firms for the 
purpose of producing gross output are deflated by the intermediate input price index.
10
  
In the second-stage, we regress firm-level TFP on a series of firm-level and sector-level 
controls, as described in equation (2):  
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 In equation (2), lnTFP ≡ lnYijt – [αLlnLijt + αKlnKijt + + αMlnMijt], where αL, αK and αM are 
obtained by the OP estimation.  The αi represent firm-level fixed effects and αt represent annual 
time dummies.  ForeignShareHKTMijt, ForeignShareFRijt, and StateShareijt are defined as the 
share of the firm’s total equity owned by Hong Kong-Taiwan-Macau investors, foreign investors, 
                                                        
8 For example, the furniture industry (coded as 19 in Table 2) includes 5 four-digit sub-sectors.  These are wood furniture 
manufacturing (2110), bamboo furniture manufacturing (2120), metal furniture manufacturing (2130), plastic furniture 
manufacturing (2140), and other furniture manufacturing (2190). 
9 Sector-specific ex-factory price indices for industrial products appear in China Urban Life and Price Yearbook (2008, Table 
4-3-3). The price indices are published for 29 individual sectors, consequently we created a concordance between the 29 and the 
71 sectors.  
10 Price indices for fixed investment and industry-wide intermediate inputs are reported in the China Statistical Yearbook (2006) 
(obtained from the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
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and the state respectively.
11
  By construction, these three firm-level controls are continuous 
variables that range from 0 to 1 in value
12
.  
Following Javorcik (2004), we define three sector-level FDI variables.  First, Horizontaljt 
captures the extent of foreign presence in sector j at time t and is defined as foreign equity 
participation averaged over all firms in the sector, weighted by each firm’s share in sectoral 
output.  In other words,  
),3(/* 


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




jiforalli
it
jiforalli
ititjt
YYreForeignShaHorizontal , 
where
it
reForeignSha is the sum of reHKTMForeignSha and reFRForeignSha . Second, 
Backwardjt captures the foreign presence in the sectors that are supplied by sector j
13
. Therefore, 
Backwardjt is a measure for foreign participation in the downstream industries of sector j.  It is 
defined as  
).4(
kt
jkifk
jkjt
HorizontalBackward 

   
The value of jk is taken from the 2002 input-output table
14
 representing the proportion of sector 
j’s production supplied to downstream sector k.  
    Finally, Forwardjt is defined as the weighted share of output in upstream industries of sector 
j produced by firms with foreign capital participation.  As Javorcik points out, since only 
                                                        
11 The omitted share, the non-state domestically-owned share, is represented by the constant term.   
12
 In some specifications, we run regressions with domestic firms only. For these cases, we use the sample of domestic 
firms with zero foreign investment. At the individual establishment level, we control for two types of FDI: ForeignShareHKTMijt, 
and ForeignShareFRijt.  This allows us to determine whether some types of foreign investment are more productive than others.  
It is generally assumed that OECD-based FDI is more technology-intensive than HKMT FDI.  On the other hand, HKMT FDI 
may be more physically and organizationally integrated with domestic operations than OECD-based FDI.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests large quantities of so-called foreign investors in China are actually domestic investors who channel investment through 
Hong Kong in order to take advantage of special treatment for foreign firms (so-called “round tripping”).  If this is the case, then 
we would expect that firms with HKMT ownership might be less productive than other types of FDI. 
13 For instance, both the furniture and apparel industries use leather to produce leather sofas and leather jackets. Suppose the 
leather processing industry sells 1/3 of its output to furniture producers and 2/3 of its output to jacket producers. If no 
multinationals produce furniture but half of all jacket production comes from foreign affiliates, the Backward variable will be 
calculated as follows: 1/3*0+2/3*1/2=1/3.  
14 Input-output tables of China (2002) Table 4.2, which divides manufacturing industry into 71 sectors.  
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intermediates sold in the domestic market are relevant to the study, goods produced by foreign 
affiliates for exports (Xit) should be excluded.  Thus, the following formula is applied:  
).5()(/)(*
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The value of jm is also taken from 2002 input-output table.  Since Horizontaljt already captures 
linkages between firms within a sector, inputs purchased within sector j are excluded from both 
Backwardjt and Forwardjt. 
To test for trade interactions with FDI and control for the effects of trade policies, we have 
created a time series of tariffs, obtained from the World Integrated Trading Solution (WITS), 
maintained by the World Bank.  We first created a concordance between the tariff data and the 
Chinese census data at the most disaggregated level possible.
15
  Then, we aggregate up output 
tariffs to the same industry classification as sectoral FDI, giving us a total of 71 sectors (see 
Table 2).
16
    
We also created a measure of input tariffs. To construct input tariffs, we use China’s 
Input-Ouput table (2002) and follow the procedures suggested by Amiti and Konings (2007). The 
input tariffs are constructed as a weighted average of the output tariffs.
17
  Finally, we construct a 
dummy variable, WTO, equal to one after China entered the World Trade Organization at the end 
of 2001.  This is a time dummy equal to zero from 1998 through 2001 and equal to 1 from 2002 
onwards.  The WTO dummy captures the impact of reforms not captured by tariff measures 
(such as reductions in non-tariff barriers).  The WTO dummy also captures the aggregate 
                                                        
15 This was a challenge given that the two series are not in the same nomenclature.  For example, we have different categories 
for ship-building, electronic computers, tobacco products, motor vehicles, and parts and accessories for motor vehicles. 
16 To aggregate the tariff line items to the level which would allow us to create a concordance with the census data, we used 
output for 2003 as weights. 
17
 The weights are based on input-output table. For instance, if a chocolate producer uses 60 percent sugar and 40 percent 
cocoa pounder, the input tariff for that chocolate industry is equal to 60 percent of the sugar tariff plus 40 percent of the cocoa 
tariff.  Since China’s input-out tables only allow us to calculate input tariffs at the three-digit level, we use the same level of 
3-digit disaggregation for final goods tariffs as well. 
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increase in market access for Chinese firms to export destinations. 
 
IV. Data and Broad Trends 
 
The dataset employed in this paper was collected by the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics.  The Statistical Bureau conducts an annual survey of industrial plants, which includes 
manufacturing firms as well as firms that specialize in mining operations and those that produce 
and supply electricity, gas, and water.  The data set is firm-level based, including all 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), regardless of size, and non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) with 
annual sales of more than 5 million Yuan. We use a ten-year unbalanced panel dataset, from 1998 
to 2007.  The number of firms per year varies from a low of 162,033 in 1999 to a high of 
336,768 in 2007. The sampling strategy is the same throughout the period; the variation in 
numbers is driven by changes in ownership or sales volume relative to the threshold.
18
   
The dataset contains information on output, fixed assets, total workforce, total wages, 
intermediate inputs, foreign investment, Hong Kong-Taiwan-Macau investment, sales revenue, 
and export sales.
19
 We use the criterion of zero foreign ownership to distinguish domestic firms 
and foreign owned firms, that is, domestic firms are those with zero foreign capital in their total 
assets.  In the dataset, 1,197,597 observations or 77.5 percent of the observations meet the 
                                                        
18 The data show that the 5 million yuan threshold is not a strict rule. Among non-SOEs, about 6 percent of the firms report 
annual sales of less than 5 million yuan in 1998; this number rises to 8 percent by 1999 and falls after 2003. In 2007, only 1 
percent of non-SOEs have annual sales below 5 million yuan.   
19 The original dataset over the ten-year period includes 2,226,104 observations and contains identifiers that can be used to track 
firms over time.  Since the study focuses on manufacturing firms, we eliminate non-manufacturing observations.  The sample 
size is further reduced by deleting missing values, as well as observations with negative or zero values for output, number of 
employees, capital, and the inputs, leaving a sample size of 1,842,786.  Due to incompleteness of information on official output 
price indices, which are reported annually in the official publication, three sectors are dropped from the sample. They are the 
following sectors: processing food from agricultural products; printing, reproduction of recording media; and general purpose 
machinery.   Thus, our final regression sample size is 1,545,626.  
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criterion of domestic firms; 22.5 percent are designated as foreign firms.
20
  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in the regressions. The 
summary statistics report the mean of the ratios, which is different than weighted means that 
would give more weight to larger firms.  The first three columns report means for levels and the 
last three columns report means for growth rates of the key variables used in the analysis. 
The statistical means highlight the remarkable growth rates exhibited by the manufacturing 
sector during this period, with average real output growing 13.5 percent a year, and the net 
capital stock growing 10.7 percent per year.  Labor input grew significantly slower, with 
average annual increases of only 1.3 percent per year.  Total factor productivity (TFP), which is 
calculated using the Olley-Pakes two step approach described in more detail in the next section, 
grew on average 5.6 percent per year, implying a forty percent contribution to overall growth.  
The means also document that, on average, foreign-invested assets have been almost evenly split 
between sources in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau (“HKTM”), and foreign investment 
originating in other locations.  The first three columns indicate that the state continues to play 
an important role in manufacturing, with a mean asset share of 8.9 percent during the sample 
period; over the sample period the total share of total foreign investment in manufacturing is 
significantly larger, at 16.8 percent.  For the sample as a whole, the average state share during 
this period fell by approximately 0.7 percentage point per year. 
 The summary statistics for final goods and input tariffs appear in Tables 1 and 2.  During 
the sample period, average tariffs fell for final goods and input tariffs by 87 and 36 percent 
                                                        
20 Actually, the international criterion used to distinguish domestic and foreign-invested firms is 10%, that is, the share of 
subscribed capital owned by foreign investors is equal to or less than 10%.  In an earlier version of the paper, we tested whether 
the results are sensitive to using zero, 10%, and 25% foreign ownership. Our results show that between the zero and 10% 
thresholds, the magnitude and the significance levels of the estimated coefficients remain close, which makes us comfortable 
using the more restrictive sample of domestic firms for which the foreign capital share is zero. The results based on the 25% 
criterion exhibit small differences, but the results are generally robust to the choice of definition for foreign versus domestic 
ownership.  
18 
 
respectively, significant declines for a ten year period.  While the average level of tariffs during 
this period, which spans the years before and after WTO accession, was nearly 13 percent, as 
shown in Table 2, this average masks significant heterogeneity across sectors, with a high of 41 
percent in grain mill products and a low of 4 percent in railroad equipment.   
One issue which arises is the question of the endogeneity of the tariff changes in the data.  
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) argue that in the case of India’s trade reforms that began in earnest 
in 1991, the largest tariff cuts were in those sectors where tariffs were initially high, in order to 
comply with WTO entry provisions.  Thus, in the case of India, tariff reductions followed from 
initial tariff levels, a condition that helps to address the fear that tariff changes could be 
endogeneous with respect to productivity changes at the firm level.  We see a similar pattern of 
tariff reductions in the Chinese case.  The scatter plot shown in Figure 4 demonstrates that tariff 
reductions were highest in those sectors where tariff levels were high at the beginning of the 
sample period.  Thus the reductions were broadly rule-based rather than specific to industry 
characteristics.  In addition, tariffs are defined at the 2 digit level; since tariff categories are 
quite broad (see Table 2), it is difficult to argue that they are set endogeneously with respect to 
disaggregated firm level behavior.   
In Tables 3-1 and 3-2, we provide summary statistics for the FDI spillover variables in 
relation to the government’s assignment of tax holidays.  Table 3-1 reports annual figures for 
means of the output shares calculated separately for clusters of FDI that do and do not receive 
corporate income subsidies.  In the left panel of Table 3-1, we define our sector-level foreign 
output shares for only those foreign firms that paid less than the statutory tax rate.  In the right 
panel of Table 3-1, we include sector-level output shares for foreign-invested firms that paid the 
full rate.  The trends show a steady increase in the share of subsidized foreign investment 
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between 1998 and 2007.  In 1998, at the beginning of the sample period, subsidized FDI 
accounted for less than to 8 percent of sectoral output, while foreign firms without any sort of tax 
holidays accounted for nearly 12 percent of sectoral output.  By the end of the sample period, 
while the share of output represented by foreign-invested firms with no tax holidays remained 
virtually unchanged, the output share represented by foreign investors receiving some form of 
tax holiday had grown to nearly 14 percent.  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of income taxes on profits paid by different types of 
enterprises for the year 2004.  We calculated these effective tax rates using reported income 
taxes paid as a share of profits, as reported in our dataset.  The top left-hand side quadrant 
shows that a large share of domestically-owned firms, both SOEs and non-SOEs, paid the 33 
percent tax rate.  In principle, foreign firms received a 15 percent tax subsidy.  As shown in 
Figure 3, only a small minority of foreign-invested firms paid the statutory rate, as indicated by 
the bottom right-hand side quadrant.  In 2004, seven percent of foreign-invested firms paid the 
statutory rate, compared to almost 40 percent for domestically-owned enterprises; a considerable 
proportion of the foreign-invested firms appear to have paid corporate tax rates of 20 percent or 
more. 
Table 3-2 reports the percentage of firms that reported subsidies on their valued added taxes, 
which are reported separately from income taxes on profits.  We were also able to calculate 
actual effective tax rates for value added, since firms separately reported value added taxes paid 
as well as value-added.  Relative to the proportion of firms receiving subsidies on their income 
taxes, fewer firms receive subsidies in the form of exemptions on value-added taxes.  These 
exemptions increased until 2003, then declined.  It is clear from these tables that income tax 
holidays were a more pervasive form of incentives until the 2008 tax reform.   
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V. Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
Below, we describe our estimation strategy, the baseline estimation results based on 
Equation (1), and several variations on that basic regression model for the purpose of examining 
various interaction effects among the industrial policies under study.  Our estimation strategy 
also tests for the implications of firm heterogeneity within our sample.  We also describe our 
robustness checks.   
A. Estimation strategy.  We first compute estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) for 
each firm and each year observation.  We divide the sample into two ownership sub-samples.  
These are (a) all firms and (b) domestic, private firms, which exclude foreign owned enterprises 
and SOEs.  These subsamples and the relevant estimation results are shown in Table A-1.  
The earlier literature on the estimation of production functions shows that the use of OLS 
may be inappropriate, since this method treats labor, capital and other input variables as 
exogenous. As Griliches and Mairesse (1995) argue, factor inputs should be considered 
endogenous, since their choice is affected by the firm’s productivity.  Firm-level fixed effects 
alone will not solve the problem, because time-varying productivity shocks can affect a firm’s 
input decisions.  Using OLS can therefore bias estimates of the relevant coefficients. To solve 
the simultaneity problem, we employ the procedure suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) 
(henceforth OP), which uses investment as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks.   
Table A-1 reports comparisons of the coefficient estimates using the OP approach.  As a 
robustness check, we also employ the procedure suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
(henceforth LP), which uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. 
Applying these two-stage procedures, both OP (1996) and LP (2003), one would anticipate that 
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the coefficient on labor and intermediate inputs should decrease relative to the OLS fixed effects 
estimator, while the coefficient on capital should increase.  To save on space we only report the 
results using the OP, not the LP procedure or OLS with firm fixed effects.  The results are 
qualitatively similar using both the OP and LP approaches, but LP suffers from the fact that the 
efficiency of material input use is ignored.  The results are generally consistent with these 
predictions across ownership classes.  Relative to OLS with firm fixed effects the coefficient on 
capital inputs is higher using OP across all specifications.  We also generally find that the 
coefficient on the labor shares and material shares are lower with OP compared to OLS.   
One notable feature across all specifications is that the labor estimate is relatively small, 
compared to estimates for other countries, while the coefficient for material inputs is rather high.  
As a robustness check, we performed a test in which we use various variables within our data set 
to compute labor’s factor income share.  Although the estimation procedure shown in Table A-1 
does not impose these restrictive conditions of perfect competition with constant returns to scale, 
the coefficients on the factor inputs in our estimating equations sum to 0.904, close to constant 
returns to scale.  Hence, the factor income shares computed from the data in our data set should 
be similarly comparable to the factor output elasticities shown in Table A1.  Using the data for 
the full sample, we compute an average factor income share for 1998-2007 as equal to 0.105.  
While this is somewhat larger than 0.086, the OP estimate reported in Table A-1, the difference is 
small.   Moreover, if our estimate of TFP deviates from the true TFP level by a constant 
time-invariant scalar, the fixed effects procedure that we use in the second stage should wash out 
the difference.
21
  
B. Baseline results.  The baseline results are presented in Table 4.  In all the results 
                                                        
21   Moreover, if our estimate of TFP deviates from the true TFP level by a constant time-invariant scalar, the fixed effects 
procedure that we use in the second stage should wash out the difference. 
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which follow, we separate firms into foreign-invested firms—those with some positive foreign 
ownership—and domestically-owned firms—defined as enterprises with zero foreign ownership. 
We first examine the impact of horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers. 
FDI spillover estimates.  The results for “All firms” are shown in column (1) of Table 4; 
those for foreign invested firms appear in column (2), and those for domestically-owned firms 
are shown in column (3).  For the samples including all firms (column 1) and domestic firms 
only (column 3), the coefficients on the state’s share in equity are negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that increases in state-invested shares are associated with lower 
productivity.  We discuss the different effects of spillovers across more detailed ownership 
categories in subsection C below.  The results for the state share are consistent with the 
expectation of rising productivity for privatizing enterprises.   
Table 4 shows a divergent pattern of results for horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers.  
Backward spillovers are largest in magnitude across all three samples. Seemingly, with higher 
proportions of FDI firms downstream, both foreign-invested and domestic upstream suppliers 
need to be more productive to prosper as suppliers.  Our estimated coefficient on backward 
linkages implies that a one percentage point increase in backward FDI is associated with a 0.8 to 
1.1 percentage point increase in TFP.  These magnitudes are twice as large as those found by 
Blalock and Gertler (2008) for Indonesia but smaller than Javorcik’s (2004) findings for 
Lithuania.  The results are also somewhat smaller than the robust backward spillover estimates 
reported by Lin et al (2009), although their paper does not break out the sample by foreign and 
domestic firms.   
For horizontal, intra-industry spillovers, our results show robust results for foreign firms but 
not for domestic firms.  Presumably domestic firms, at lower levels on the technology frontier, 
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are less able to capture productivity enhancing impacts from foreign firms within the same 
industry. By comparison, the forward spillovers show that domestic firms that are downstream 
from FDI suppliers appear to benefit more than their foreign counterparts.  This finding 
suggests that domestic-owned firms are more likely to purchase and benefit from upstream 
inputs supplied by foreign firms than other foreign firms.  
The impact of tariff protection/liberalization. The coefficients on both the final goods tariffs 
and input tariffs in Table 4 are positive but not statistically significant. There are several reasons 
why the negative impact of input or final goods tariffs on productivity may be attenuated in 
China.  A large fraction of firms, particularly exporters, are granted exemptions from paying 
tariffs; without additional information on which firms pay input tariffs, it is difficult to identify 
the negative effect of tariffs on inputs for individual firms.  Second, tariffs may be imposed for 
a number of reasons.  If tariffs are successfully imposed in sectors where there are externalities 
in production, then the average effect of tariffs may reflect both (beneficial) targeting and 
(harmful) disincentives associated with x-inefficiency.   
Third, to the extent that Melitz (2003) is correct, many of the productivity gains associated 
with trade reform may occur through reallocating production towards more efficient firms, rather 
than within-firm productivity increases associated with greater exposure to international 
competition.  The framework for this paper explicitly measures only the within firm impact of 
productivity changes associated with tariff reforms, not the cross-firm reallocation that could 
occur as the least efficient firms exit and the more efficient firms acquire greater market share.  
Nevertheless, recent estimates for both India and China suggest that during this sample period, as 
much as 95 percent of productivity increases in manufacturing were due to within firm 
productivity increases, not reallocation towards more productive firms (Harrison, Martin, and 
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Nataraj (2013), Aghion et al (2014)).  This suggests that reallocation of production is not the 
driving force behind productivity growth in China. 
In contrast to the insignificant effects of tariff changes on within-firm productivity changes, 
the coefficient on the WTO dummy is positive and significant across all subsamples, but is much 
smaller for foreign invested enterprises (FIEs).  The positive and significant point estimates 
suggest that China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001 was accompanied by a very large 
increase in within-firm productivity.  These large and significant effects of WTO entry stand in 
contrast to the insignificant and positive tariff effects. Taken together, these results suggest that 
market access for Chinese exporters and overall changes in the post-WTO membership period 
led to enormous productivity gains, even if internal tariff reforms by themselves did not. 
Table 4 and this section yield several robust findings.  These are the pattern of backward 
FDI spillovers controlling for tariffs across ownership types, the differential impacts of 
horizontal spillovers appearing to benefit FIEs and SOEs only, and forward spillovers 
advantaging all enterprises.  In addition, we find evidence that the tariffs on final goods and 
inputs had no significant impact, but that WTO entry led to a large and significant increase in 
performance across all firms.  From this baseline, we now explore different policy and 
ownership interactions to enhance the gains from FDI spillovers. 
   
C.  The Role of Ownership and FDI Spillovers 
 
In Table 4, we saw that the coefficient on the state’s share in equity is generally negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that higher levels of state-invested shares are associated 
with lower levels of productivity.  The coefficient estimate, which was -0.017 in column (1) of 
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Table 4, suggests that after controlling for other factors, moving from 100 percent SOE to 100 
percent private would be associated with a productivity gain of nearly two percentage points.  
Now we will explore how other factors, including FDI spillovers and trade policy, vary by 
ownership type. 
In Table 5, we divide the samples of foreign-invested and domestic firms into two groups, 
SOEs and non-SOEs, to test whether the formal ownership structure and the composition of asset 
ownership matter for FDI spillover effects and trade policies.  As in Table 4, all of the 
regressions are estimated with firm-level fixed effects and year effects, and robust standard 
errors are clustered at the sector level.  The results in columns (1) and (2) include all SOEs and 
all non-SOEs, with and without foreign-equity participation.  Columns (3) and (4) show the 
results using the sample of foreign-invested firms, and columns (5) and (6) present the results 
using the sample of the domestically-owned firms with zero foreign equity participation.  
The first two columns allow us to compare the impact of firm-level equity participation by 
foreign investors on the productivity of SOEs relative to non-SOEs.  The coefficient on foreign 
participation from foreign investors outside of Greater China (HKMT) for SOEs is 0.007 and 
significant relative to 0.05 and not significant for non-SOEs.  This result suggests that foreign 
equity participation is associated with an improvement in productivity which is greater for SOEs.  
The larger and statistically significant coefficient associated with foreign equity participation in 
SOEs is consistent with the hypothesis that firms with foreign equity have played an important 
role in improving SOE performance.  
Comparing FDI spillover impacts on SOEs and non-SOEs, forward spillovers are 
significant and robust for all types of enterprises.  As shown in the fourth column, SOEs with 
some foreign-investment appear to be most effective at capturing productivity benefits from both 
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upstream and downstream FDI clusters.  Some of this estimated benefit may result from flows 
of capital and technology from downstream FDI users to their upstream SOE suppliers and from 
upstream FDI suppliers to their downstream SOE buyers.  
With respect to horizontal spillovers, among the six estimates, we only see evidence of 
significant spillovers to other FIEs or to SOEs.  Among the population of firms in our sample, 
this set of firms may best exhibit the combination of a significant technology gap and capacity to 
absorb the relevant technologies to narrow the gap.  Private or non FIE invested enterprises may 
not exhibit a substantial gap with foreign invested firms or they may not have the absorptive 
capacity to effectively capture these proximate intra-industry technologies.  This result is 
broadly consistent with the findings of the three papers reviewed in our literature review, which 
find negligible, or negative, intra-industry FDI spillover impacts.   
Concerning the matter of tariffs and trade liberalization, Table 5 shows significantly different 
responses to tariffs across SOEs and non-SOEs.  Relative to non-SOEs, in the face of higher 
final goods tariffs, SOEs exhibit significantly lower productivity, particularly in the 
foreign-invested sector.  The point estimates on final goods tariffs, which are -0.076 for SOEs 
with foreign investment and -0.052 for those with no foreign assets, suggests that a one percent 
reduction in tariffs (ceteris paribus) would increase productivity by 0.076 to 0.052 percent 
respectively.  The relative responsiveness of productivity to tariff reduction in the state sector 
suggests that the persistence of tariff protection for SOEs may have created or sustained more 
inefficiency in the state enterprises that could not be sustained in the face of increased final 
goods competition.   
In Table 5, we also distinguish between the effects of WTO entry across ownership types.  
While WTO entry was associated with significant increases in productivity across all ownership 
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types, important differences emerge.  The benefits from WTO entry were smallest for foreign 
invested enterprises, which is consistent with those firms being closest to the technology frontier 
and benefiting least from increasing market access and global competition.  In constrast, the 
benefits were greatest for domestic enterprises.  The coefficient for domestic, non-SOEs was 
0.315, compared to 0.026 for FIEs without state ownership.  This suggests that gains from 
WTO entry were 15 times larger for domestic relative to foreign enterprises.  
The F-tests listed at the bottom of the Table 5 identify whether vertical and horizontal 
spillovers from FDI were significantly different across SOEs and non-SOEs.  Across all subsets 
of enterprises, spillover differences from FDI exhibit a markedly different pattern for SOEs 
relative to private enterprises.  Backward spillovers were three times as large for SOEs with 
foreign partners relative to private firms with foreign partners.  Forward spillovers were also 
significantly larger for SOEs with foreign partners relative to non-SOEs.  However, for SOEs 
without foreign partners, spillovers were significantly smaller than for other domestic enterprises.  
The results suggest that the benefits to SOEs from foreign externalities were largest when those 
SOEs also had foreign partners.  Due to these ownership differences, in the rest of the paper we 
further differentiate categories of ownership by reporting the separate effects of horizontal and 
vertical spillovers for SOEs, private, and joint venture enterprises.  
 
D. Trade Policy Changes and FDI Spillovers.  While there is a large literature which 
investigates the impact of FDI on productivity, as well as an even larger literature that explores 
the relationship between trade policies and productivity (for an overview of both these topics, see 
Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010)), we are not aware of any study that examines how 
changing levels of protection affect the magnitude of FDI spillovers.  In this section, we explore 
28 
 
how FDI spillovers changed with a discrete change in trade policy: China’s entry into the WTO. 
Specifically, we explore changes in FDI spillover impacts before and after China’s 
ascension to the WTO in 2001.  We know that China’s 2001 WTO ascension led to a substantial 
decline in tariffs.  Table 2, for example, shows that for over 71 industry categories, during 1998 
to 2007, China’s average manufacturing final goods tariff was 12.7 percent.  By 2007, the 
average final goods tariff in that year had declined by 8.9 percent to just 30 percent of the 
average for the sample period.  Our question, therefore, is whether this across the board 
reduction in tariffs during 1998-2007 affected the magnitude or direction of China’s FDI 
spillovers.     
We explore how trade policy changes affected FDI spillovers through two different 
specifications.  First, in Table 6A, we add an interaction term for WTO entry and FDI at the 
vertical and horizontal level.  This means that we add three interaction terms: Horizontal*WTO, 
Backward*WTO, and Forward*WTO.  In Table 6B, we instead interact our FDI measures with 
tariffs.  To the extent that trade policy affects the magnitude of FDI spillovers, we would expect 
the interactions to be significant.  If greater trade liberalization positively affects spillovers, we 
would expect the interactions with the WTO dummy variable to be positive and the interactions 
with tariffs to be negative.     
In Table 6A, we explore how vertical and horizontal linkages varied before and after 
China’s WTO entry at the end of 2001.  With China’s entry into the WTO in the middle of the 
sample period, domestic content rules became illegal and tariffs were significantly reduced.  
The results in Table 6A indicate that vertical backward linkages were strengthened during the 
second half of the sample period, when tariffs were lowered and domestic content restrictions 
relaxed.  Among the three spillover directions, the most dramatic change is the set of backward 
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spillover estimates for which the number of robust estimates rises. The interaction between 
Backward FDI and WTO is significant for all subsamples except for SOEs partnering with 
foreign enterprises.  The coefficient estimates suggest that backward linkages shifted from 
negative to large, positive and significant post-WTO entry. 
Table 6B confirms the findings from Table 6A, using actual tariff levels instead of the WTO 
dummy to measure the interaction with sectoral FDI linkages.  Once we take into account the 
possible interaction with tariffs, we find large, significant, and positive effects of backward 
linkages across all types of enterprises.  Horizontal linkages generally become small in 
magnitude and insignificant across all types of enterprises.  Forward linkages remain significant 
for foreign-invested SOEs, but not for other types of firms.  The interaction between tariffs and 
backward linkages is significant and negative, indicating that higher tariffs reduce backward 
spillovers, across all ownership types. 
 Hence, the most dramatic impact of China’s WTO ascension on FDI spillover outcomes is 
evident in our backward linkage estimates.  As shown in Tables 6A and 6B, the increase in 
backward spillover impacts is notable for each of the four distinct ownership types we explore: 
foreign-invested SOEs and non-SOEs and domestic-owned SOEs and non-SOEs.  The 
across-the-board tariff reductions appear not to have affected the efficacy of horizontal and 
forward linkages. The increase in the robustness of backward linkages is likely to reflect the fact 
that the combination of tariff reductions and reductions in domestic content restrictions required 
upsteam suppliers to improve the efficiency and quality of the inputs they supplied to cost and 
quality-conscious downstream foreign invested firms. With the reduction in barriers to trade, 
downstream foreign producers could choose to alternatively source from overseas foreign 
suppliers to substitute for established upstream producers that had benefited from pre-WTO trade 
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barriers.  The threat of alternative suppliers and the reduction in trade distortions together led to 
significant increases in backward linkages across all ownership categories of enterprises. 
E.  The Effects of Tax Incentives on FDI Spillovers.  In Tables 7 and 8 we explore the 
extent to which subsidized foreign investment exerts a differential impact on spillovers relative 
to unsubsidized foreign investment.  While the standard income tax rates across all firms during 
the sample period 1998-2007 was 33 percent, a large share of foreign-owned firms was granted 
tax subsidies and faced tax rates that were significantly lower.  We are able to calculate the 
extent of subsidies by calculating for each enterprise their effective tax rate, defined as taxes on 
corporate profits divided by net profits.  The difference between the corporate tax rate and the 
actual tax rate paid is how we define the extent of the establishment-specific subsidy.  Since the 
data separates out income taxes paid and value-added taxes paid by the enterprise, we are able to 
separately calculate tax holidays on both income tax and VAT obligations. 
The summary statistics reported in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 suggest that the majority of foreign 
investment in China during the sample period benefited from income tax subsidies and a 
significant fraction benefited from subsidies on value-added taxes.  To the extent that the 
Chinese government successfully targeted sectors and firms more likely to convey positive 
externalities, we would expect more robust spillovers effects emanating from the firms and 
sectors benefitting from subsidies.  To test for the possibility of differential spillover effects, we 
split our sector-level foreign share variables into two groups: one is calculated based on foreign 
investment being subsidized (those paying less than the statutory tax rate)
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 and the other series 
is computed based on non-subsidized foreign investment.  
The results, summarized in Table 7, once again show that much of the action centered on 
                                                        
22 As discussed earlier, the statutory tax rate in China is 33%. However, foreign-invested firms receive a preferential tax break of 
15%.  In this paper, we use the cut-off of a 20% tax rate to distinguish whether a foreign-invested firm is being subsidized.  
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backward spillovers.  For subsidized FDI in downstream industries, our estimated spillovers are 
both notably large and consistently robust at the one percent level across five out of six 
ownership types.  For unsubsidized FDI, the backward spillovers become insignificant or even 
negative for all firms except SOEs with foreign investment.  The F-tests at the bottom of Table 
7 are only significant for subsidized FDI, suggesting that on average, tax holidays did indeed 
target sectors with greater externalities.  By comparison, horizontal spillovers show no notable 
difference for intra-industry FDI that is subsidized or unsubsidized.  The robust forward 
spillovers for foreign invested firms, whether SOEs or not, persist in about the same degree with 
and without subsidies to upstream industries.  
The results in Table 7 suggest that when subsidized downstream FDI appears to have more 
impact than unsubsidized FDI.  While these results are consistent with smart tax policies, our 
results cannot at this point be interpreted as causal.  What is evident, however, is that 
foreign-owned buyers of upstream domestic inputs were more likely to generate spillovers when 
they also received tax holidays. Downstream subsidized FDI may have attracted different kinds 
of downstream producers than unsubsidized investors.  This issue deserves further research.  
What Table 7 does indicate is that tax holidays to downstream foreign firms were more likely to 
be associated with positive externalities than tax holidays to upstream foreign firms.   
In Table 8, we test whether the results differ when we explore tax holidays on value-added 
taxes as a form of fiscal incentive rather than the income tax holidays examined above.  In 
Table 8, we redefine subsidized firms on the basis of lower value-added taxes instead of lower 
corporate income taxes.  We define firms as subsidized when they are exempted altogether from 
paying value-added taxes.  Overall, the results in Table 8 are consistent with differences in the 
effects of foreign investment based on income tax incentives, i.e. the provision of subsidies is 
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associated with larger, more robust spillovers.  However, the composition of the spillover 
effects of VAT holidays differs somewhat from reductions in corporate income taxes.  Here 
much of the action focuses on horizontal spillovers.  The non-subsidized horizontal FDI 
seemingly creates fewer or no spillovers; by contrast, the horizontal spillovers associated with 
firms that enjoy VAT subsidies are consistently large and robust at the one percent level of 
significance.   
The evidence presented in Tables 7 and 8 suggests that across both corporate taxes and VAT 
obligations, tax holidays were consistently associated with higher externalities from FDI.  In the 
case of corporate tax holidays, most of the differences were in the magnitude of backward 
linkages.  For VAT obligations, most of the differences were in intra-industry spillovers.  
While we cannot identify the causal linkages, the evidence is consistent with an industrial policy 
such as China’s “technology for market” program, where foreign firms that agreed to make 
accessible aspects of their technology may have received, in return, corporate income tax 
holidays or VAT subsidies for their investment and production.   
F.  Robustness Tests.  Since our dependent variable is firm-level productivity and the 
focus of the analysis is on how sector-level foreign investment affects domestic firm productivity, 
endogeneity is unlikely to be an issue.  To the extent that foreign investment might be attracted 
to sectors where suppliers or users are more productive, this condition is accounted for by the use 
of firm-level fixed effects.  Furthermore, where foreign investment is drawn to sectors that 
exhibit either high or low tariffs (or possibly systematically high or low productivity levels), the 
inclusion of the tariff variable will control for this potential source of omitted variable 
endogeneity bias. 
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        However, some might argue that foreign investors are drawn to sectors where they 
expect higher productivity growth in the future.  To address this potential source of endogeneity, 
we also applied instrumental variables (IV) techniques which are available upon request from the 
authors. We used future tariffs (tariffs at time t+1) as instruments.  For backward linkages for 
domestic non-SOEs, the point estimates were magnified, confirming the importance of the 
linkages between domestic suppliers and foreign-owned buyers of their inputs.  However, the 
coefficients on horizontal linkages became negative across all subsamples, but not statistically 
significant.  The negative coefficient on the horizontal variable is consistent with our evidence 
suggesting lack of significant intra-industry spillovers to domestic non-SOEs in this paper as 
well as previous work by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and others suggesting that foreign firms 
take away market share from domestic competitors in the same industry.   
  
VI. Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper, we investigate how tax and tariff policies affect FDI spillovers in Chinese 
industry.  Is it possible to enhance the externalities from FDI through trade policies or tax 
holidays?  We find that the answer is yes.  We also explore how externalities from FDI, tariffs, 
and tax holidays vary across China’s heterogenous ownership structure.  To our knowledge, this 
is the first study to examine whether targeted subsidies for FDI are associated with stronger 
linkages from FDI to domestically-owned and/or foreign-invested firms.  To identify the 
interactions between FDI spillovers and trade policies, we examine the role of both tariff 
reductions and China’s entry into the WTO.  
By taking into account trade policy changes and interactions between trade and FDI, our 
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results indicate significantly higher effects of backward linkages in China.  In fact, prior to 
China’s entry into the WTO backward linkages appear to be negative and the very large and 
significant backward externalities only emerge once we take into account the impact of trade 
reforms on FDI. The positive impact of backward linkages which emerges post-trade reform is 
consistent with the early literature on immiserizing FDI, which posited negative effects of FDI in 
highly protected economies.   
Across a variety of specifications, we find that backward and forward linkages increased 
the productivity of Chinese and joint venture enterprises.  Horizontal linkages, however, were 
generally restricted to FIEs and SOEs.  In other words, positive externalities within the same 
sector were restricted to public enterprises or to other joint ventures. During our sample period, 
all of these spillover channels, particularly the vertical linkages, were affected by industrial 
policy associated with tariff reductions and the deployment of corporate income and VAT 
subsidies.   
 Exploiting the exogenous change in trade policies with China’s entry into the WTO at the 
end of 2001, we investigate the impact of China’s substantial tariff liberalization on the 
magnitude and direction of FDI productivity spillovers.  We do this in two ways.  First we 
interact tariff changes with our measures of sectoral FDI.  Second, we interact WTO entry with 
sectoral FDI.  Using both approaches shows that trade liberalization was accompanied by 
significant increases in FDI linkages, particularly for backward linkages. Since China’s entry into 
the WTO created pressure to phase out domestic content rules (in order to comply with the 
WTO), we might have expected to find a reduction in backward linkage spillovers.  Instead, 
backward linkages became stronger after WTO entry, possibly because the additional 
competition forced domestic suppliers to improve their efficiency and quality.  The increase in 
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vertical linkages from FDI following the reduction in trade distortions is consistent with an 
earlier academic literature that posited welfare losses from FDI attracted by tariff distortions. 
Finally, we explore the spillover implications of tax subsidies that have been targeted to 
foreign investment within certain sectors and by certain firms.  We find strong evidence that 
subsidized foreign investment generates greater productivity spillovers than unsubsidized 
investment.  The estimates imply that a one percent increase in the share of foreign investment 
in downstream sectors raises the supplying firm’s productivity by 2 to 3 percentage points.    
Across our sample spanning a ten year period, vertical linkages accounted for an important 
source of productivity gains for all types of enterprises.  
One advantage of incorporating different industrial policy instruments into a single 
framework is that it allows us to compare the effectiveness of these different approaches on firm 
productivity.  If a central goal of China’s industrial policy has been to raise firm productivity, 
we find that the use of different instruments has had notable positive effects but also some 
perverse impacts.  High tariffs, particularly high final goods tariffs, were associated with 
depressed productivity for SOEs.  FDI spillovers are moderate to robust, with vertical backward 
and forward spillovers particularly strong.  China’s entry into the WTO also substantially 
strengthened the impacts of vertical FDI spillovers.  FDI subsidies through the use of tax 
corporate income subsidies were associated with significantly larger backward FDI linkages; 
VAT subsidies have most strengthened the positive impact of horizontal spillovers.  During the 
period of our study, 1998-2007, China’s industrial policy has generally served to enhance the 
impacts of these spillovers.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for All Years, 1998-2007 
 
Levels 
   
Growth Rates 
  
  
Number of 
observations 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Std. Dev. 
logY 1,545,626 10.015 1.343  
1,086,616 0.135 0.563 
logL 1,545,626 4.808 1.152  
1,086,616 0.013 0.503 
logK 1,545,626 8.468 1.719  
1,086,616 0.107 0.753 
lnTFP 1,545,626 1.828 0.367  
1,086,616 0.056 0.308 
Foreign share (contributed by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau 
investors) 
1,545,626 0.089 0.267 
 
1,086,616 0.012 0.377 
Foreign share (contributed by 
other investors) 
1,545,626 0.079 0.249 
 
1,086,616 0.000 0.146 
Stateshare 1,545,626 0.089 0.272  
1,086,616 -0.007 0.147 
Horizontal FDI 1,545,626 0.254 0.142  
1,086,616 0.004 0.046 
Backward FDI 1,545,626 0.077 0.046  
1,086,616 0.002 0.015 
Forward FDI 1,545,626 0.103 0.173  
1,086,616 0.004 0.066 
Tariff on final goods 1,545,626 12.691 6.600  
1,086,616 -0.869 2.295 
Tariffs on inputs 1,545,626 9.185 4.064   1,086,616 -0.359 2.066 
Notes: We define firm-level foreign share according to its different sources. Foreign share contributed by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau is defined as the share of firms’ total equity owned by investors from 
HK-Taiwan-Macau. Foreign share contributed by other countries is defined as the share of firms’ total 
equity owned by investors outside HK-Taiwan-Macau, principally from OECD countries. State share is 
defined as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Horizontal captures the intra-industry 
FDI spillover while backward and forward represent inter-industry FDI spillovers. We define horizontal, 
backward, and forward in equation (2), (3), and (4) respectively. The unit for the tariff variable is 
percentage. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Tariffs (By Sector) 
 
Final Goods Tariff Input Tariffs 
Industry names Mean 
Difference Between 
1998 and 2007 
 
Mean 
1.Grain mill products 41.002 -18.290  19.799 
2.Forage 13.501 -7.871 1.932 
3.Vegetable oil refining 19.852 -21.772 8.796 
4.Sugar manufacturing 37.101 10.710 14.656 
5.Slaughtering and meat processing 18.949 -4.510 15.193 
6.Fish and fish products 16.052 -12.419 10.698 
7.All other food manufacturing 22.206 -13.238 12.642 
4.384 8.Wines, spirits and liquors 27.569 -34.290 
9.Soft drink and other beverages 28.916 -20.560 1.328 
10.Tobacco products 49.584 -24.000 
 
11.Cotton textiles 14.963 -13.881 14.558 
12.Woolen textiles 14.963 -13.881 11.505 
13.Hemp textiles 14.961 -13.884 8.632 
14.Textiles products 17.674 -15.005 12.958 
15.Knitted and crocheted fabrics and 
articles 
20.082 -17.936 13.452 
16.Wearing apparel 21.997 -16.212 11.568 
3.691 17.Leather, fur, down and related products 19.176 -8.271 
18.Products of wood, bamboo, cane, palm, 
straw 
8.849 -8.346 8.130 
19.Furniture 11.701 -18.51 12.740 
20.Paper and paper products 11.975 -12.734 13.265 
21.Printing, reproduction of recording 
media 
13.584 -14.950 15.092 
22.Stationary and related products 18.112 -5.306 9.624 
23.Toys, sporting and athletic and 
recreation products 
12.120 -14.198 1.494 
24.Petroleum and nuclear processing 6.499 -0.930 11.159 
25.Coking 5.479 -0.080 7.447 
26.Basic chemicals 6.848 -3.131 10.513 
27.Chemical fertilizers 7.511 3.152 2.418 
28.Chemical pesticides 8.974 -2.071 1.169 
29.Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, 
printing ink 
9.242 -3.710 10.096 
30.Man-made chemical products 10.043 -6.108 11.981 
31.Special chemical products 12.661 -5.804 10.784 
32.Chemical products for daily use 16.088 -11.882 7.675 
33.Medical and pharmaceutical products 6.535 -4.599 1.817 
34.Chemical fibers 9.825 -12.423 11.829 
35.Rubber products 16.167 -3.752 12.782 
36.Plastic products 12.583 -8.299 12.860 
37.Cement, lime and plaster 11.811 -2.741 9.913 
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38.Glass and glass products 15.457 -4.890 10.669 
39.Pottery, china and earthenware 18.236 -12.031 6.928 
40.Fireproof materials 9.777 -3.671 7.751 
41.Other nonmetallic mineral products 10.030 -2.355 8.187 
42.Iron-smelting 6.601 -3.760 7.720 
43.Steel-smelting 6.601 -3.760 9.424 
44.Steel pressing 6.601 -3.760 11.368 
45.Alloy iron smelting 6.601 -3.760 6.282 
46.Nonferrous metal smelting 6.189 -2.382 7.897 
47.Nonferrous metal pressing 5.630 -2.331 11.921 
48.Metal products 12.788 -4.814 12.599 
49.Boiler, engines and turbine 10.081 -4.635 10.693 
50.Metalworking machinery 10.978 -5.201 8.637 
51.Other general industrial machinery 10.869 -6.203 11.131 
52.Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishing machinery 
8.253 -5.070 1.163 
53.Other special industrial equipment 9.871 -5.426 9.798 
54.Railroad transport equipment 4.082 -1.340 2.403 
55.Motor vehicles 29.126 -26.921 7.771 
56.Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
17.584 -18.570 13.769 
57.Ship building 7.365 -1.151 2.488 
58.Other transport equipment 25.944 -9.094 3.349 
59.Generators 10.725 -6.465 9.195 
60.Household electric appliances 18.441 -7.963 7.640 
61.Other electric machinery and equipment 15.103 -5.202 12.144 
62.Telecommunication equipment 10.992 -13.480 4.279 
63.Electronic computer 8.422 -14.87 5.235 
64.Other computer peripheral equipment 8.352 -14.828 7.261 
65.Electronic element and device 4.912 -7.010 10.988 
66.Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
21.374 -13.97 5.635 
67.Other electronic and communication 
equipment 
9.528 -5.450 5.169 
68.Instruments, meters and other measuring 
equipment 
10.097 -5.150 8.603 
69.Cultural and office equipment 10.460 -9.548 4.231 
70.Arts and crafts products 16.980 -7.374 6.483 
71.Other manufacturing products 19.324 -5.036 9.855 
Average (all sectors) 12.691 -8.862 9.185 
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Table 3-1.  Summary Statistics for Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables (calculated based on income tax) 
  
Subsidized  Non-subsidized 
  
Horizontal Backward Forward Horizontal Backward Forward 
Year 
Number of 
Observa- 
Tions 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  
1998 95,879 0.076 0.060 0.022 0.015 0.024 0.047 0.112 0.068 0.033 0.018 0.038 0.050 
1999 103,945 0.083 0.067 0.025 0.018 0.027 0.056 0.125 0.069 0.040 0.020 0.046 0.064 
2000 102,465 0.096 0.072 0.029 0.020 0.033 0.070 0.130 0.070 0.041 0.021 0.049 0.068 
2001 114,461 0.102 0.075 0.031 0.020 0.034 0.057 0.130 0.067 0.039 0.021 0.052 0.083 
2002 122,218 0.107 0.080 0.035 0.025 0.041 0.091 0.128 0.066 0.037 0.018 0.047 0.059 
2003 138,158 0.110 0.078 0.034 0.023 0.042 0.083 0.131 0.069 0.039 0.021 0.053 0.080 
2004 202,551 0.132 0.090 0.041 0.027 0.054 0.110 0.129 0.063 0.038 0.020 0.051 0.070 
2005 194,120 0.132 0.096 0.041 0.028 0.055 0.110 0.131 0.064 0.039 0.021 0.058 0.092 
2006 216,924 0.138 0.094 0.043 0.028 0.057 0.101 0.126 0.061 0.039 0.020 0.057 0.097 
2007 254,905 0.138 0.089 0.044 0.026 0.062 0.111 0.119 0.061 0.036 0.021 0.054 0.086 
Notes: Table 3-1 reports trends in subsidized and non-subsidized foreign investment. In the left panel of Table 3-1, we redefine our sector-level foreign 
share variables by restricting them to only those foreign firms who paid less than the statutory tax rate. In the right panel of Table 3-1, we redefine 
sector-level foreign share to restrict it to those firms who paid the full rate.  
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Table 3-2.  Summary Statistics for Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables (calculated based on value added tax) 
  
Subsidized  Non-Subsidized 
  
Horizontal Backward Forward Horizontal Backward Forward 
Year 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  
1998 95,879 0.053 0.062 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.018 0.151 0.078 0.045 0.024 0.059 0.085 
1999 103,945 0.049 0.056 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.169 0.089 0.052 0.027 0.069 0.107 
2000 102,465 0.049 0.053 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.019 0.182 0.094 0.058 0.030 0.076 0.118 
2001 114,461 0.049 0.050 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.187 0.095 0.057 0.029 0.080 0.123 
2002 122,218 0.063 0.064 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.178 0.088 0.055 0.028 0.081 0.127 
2003 138,158 0.070 0.075 0.018 0.018 0.013 0.038 0.177 0.083 0.056 0.027 0.085 0.130 
2004 202,551 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2005 194,120 0.061 0.058 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.035 0.207 0.102 0.064 0.034 0.101 0.162 
2006 216,924 0.054 0.054 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.045 0.214 0.103 0.069 0.034 0.102 0.153 
2007 254,905 0.047 0.056 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.038 0.214 0.097 0.068 0.032 0.105 0.159 
Notes: In Table 3-2, we redo the exercise in Table 3-1 based on value-added tax information. The tax data are not available for 2004.   
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Table 4 Olley and Pakes Regressions with Contemporaneous Spillover Variables and Tariff Controls: all firms, 
foreign-invested, domestic firms with zero foreign investment 
 
All firms Foreign-invested firms 
Domestic firms (0 foreign 
share) 
         
Foreignshare (by HK-Taiwan-Macau) 
-0.00379 0.000847 
 (0.00312) (0.00550) 
 
Foreignshare (by other countries) 
0.00716** 0.0131** 
 (0.00342) (0.00526) 
 Stateshare -0.0170*** 0.00545 0.000450 
 
(0.00346) (0.00870) (0.00351) 
Horizontal 0.449** 0.403** 0.396 
 
(0.189) (0.192) (0.246) 
Backward 0.989 1.152** 0.867 
 
(0.644) (0.556) (1.004) 
Forward 0.427*** 0.410*** 0.744*** 
 
(0.129) (0.105) (0.224) 
lnTariff 0.0535 0.0800* 0.0562 
 
(0.0483) (0.0411) (0.0683) 
lnTariff on Inputs 0.0212 0.0354 0.0214 
 
(0.0139) (0.0240) (0.0147) 
WTO Dummy 0.376*** 0.0263*** 0.315*** 
 
(0.0393) (0.00515) (0.0288) 
Constant 1.268*** 1.299*** 1.196*** 
 
(0.151) (0.141) (0.173) 
Observations 1,540,823 347,201 1,070,523 
R-squared 0.165 0.180 0.161 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors, clustered at the sector level, are presented in parentheses. The 
dependent variable lnTFP. Each regression includes firm-fixed effects and year dummies. The dummy is 
defined as 1 if firm i has non-zero foreign share at period t, 0 otherwise.  A * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, a ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and a *** indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 5 Olley and Pakes Regressions with Contemporaneous Spillover Variables and Tariff controls: non-SOEs vs. SOEs (with the sample of 
all firms, foreign-invested, and domestic firms with zero foreign share) 
 
All firms Foreign-invested firms 
Domestic firms (zero foreign 
share) 
  Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs 
Foreign share (by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau) 
-0.00392 0.0252 0.00113 -0.0691 
  (0.00310) (0.0545) (0.00555) (0.0744) 
  
Foreign share (by other countries) 
0.00698** 0.0553 0.0131** 0.0698 
  (0.00340) (0.0427) (0.00531) (0.0708) 
  State share 0.000622 -0.0233*** 0.00483 -0.0112 0.000450 -0.0239*** 
 
(0.00291) (0.00397) (0.00896) (0.0351) (0.00351) (0.00399) 
Horizontal 0.448** 0.435*** 0.408** -0.603 0.396 0.448*** 
 
(0.197) (0.129) (0.193) (0.491) (0.246) (0.128) 
Backward 0.996 0.611 1.139** 3.592*** 0.867 0.569 
 
(0.660) (0.580) (0.558) (0.966) (1.004) (0.581) 
Forward 0.441*** 0.306** 0.410*** 0.674*** 0.744*** 0.329** 
 
(0.133) (0.116) (0.105) (0.236) (0.224) (0.125) 
lnTariff 0.0676 -0.0525* 0.0815* -0.0755** 0.0562 -0.0515 
 
(0.0511) (0.0310) (0.0414) (0.0373) (0.0683) (0.0312) 
ln Input Tariff 0.0190 0.0411*** 0.0353 0.0700** 0.0214 0.0406*** 
 
(0.0145) (0.0136) (0.0240) (0.0282) (0.0147) (0.0136) 
WTO 0.144*** 0.309*** 0.0264*** 0.203*** 0.315*** 0.310*** 
 
(0.0327) (0.0234) (0.00518) (0.0323) (0.0288) (0.0234) 
Constant 1.242*** 1.425*** 1.295*** 1.603*** 1.196*** 1.419*** 
  (0.161) (0.0740) (0.142) (0.115) (0.173) (0.0745) 
Observations 1,415,341 125,482 344,818 2,383 1,070,523 123,099 
R-squared 0.170 0.098 0.180 0.239 0.161 0.097 
Horizontal*ownership -0.024 -0.369 -0.030 
 
(0.109) (0.199) (0.109) 
F-stat (Horizontal * ownership = 0) 
0.05 3.43 0.08 
Prob>F 0.827 0.069 0.7825 
Backward*ownership -0.430 0.465 -0.408 
 
(0.280) (0.380) (0.274) 
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F-stat (Backward * ownership = 0) 
2.36 1.50 2.23 
Prob>F 0.130 0.226 0.141 
Forward*ownership -0.123 0.062 -0.140 
 
(0.065) (0.103) (0.066) 
F-stat (Forward * ownership = 0) 
3.66 0.36 4.57 
Prob>F 0.061 0.549 0.037 
F-stat (interaction terms jointly zero) 
8.97 6.08 8.14 
Prob>F 0.0001 0.011 0.0001 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable for all regression is lnTFP. All regressions 
include firm fixed effects and year dummies. Ownership is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm is a SOE and zero otherwise.  
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Table 6A: Interaction between Trade and FDI Spillovers Using WTO Entry as Measure of Trade Policy 
  All Foreign-invested firms Domestic firms 
  Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs 
Horizontal FDI 0.430** 0.379*** 0.426** -0.751 0.338  
 (0.181) (0.112) (0.198) (0.532) (0.208)  
Backward FDI 0.499 -0.259 0.486 2.977*** 0.486  
  (0.734) (0.551) (0.682) (1.070) (1.035)  
Forward FDI 0.427** 0.272 0.325* 0.638** 0.848***  
 (0.197) (0.183) (0.164) (0.262) (0.272)  
Horizontal*WTO 0.0317 0.104 -0.00297 0.399* 0.0685 0.105 
 
(0.0671) (0.0816) (0.0653) (0.231) (0.0856) (0.0824) 
Backward*WTO 0.516*** 0.812*** 0.647*** 0.00441 0.441* 0.824*** 
 
(0.190) (0.215) (0.177) (0.392) (0.228) (0.223) 
Forward*WTO 0.00870 0.0164 0.0800 -0.101 -0.113 0.00580 
 
(0.0883) (0.0993) (0.0801) (0.113) (0.0875) (0.100) 
WTO 0.106*** 0.233*** -0.0359 0.130*** 0.279*** 0.234*** 
 
(0.0295) (0.0260) (0.0231) (0.0299) (0.0314) (0.0263) 
Observations 1,415,341 125,482 344,818 2,383 1,070,523 123,099 
R-squared 0.171 0.101 0.182 0.250 0.161 0.100 
Notes: All specifications include firm fixed effects and year dummies.  Robust standard errors clustered at sector level.  WTO is a dummy equal to 1 from 2002 
onwards.  Interaction terms are sectoral FDI measures interacted with the WTO dummy.  Other controls also included from previous tables but not reported here 
(firm level FDI and SOE shares, input and final goods tariffs). 
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Table 6B: Interaction between Trade and FDI Spillovers Using Tariffs as Measure of Trade Policy 
  All Foreign-invested firms Domestic firms 
  Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs 
Horizontal FDI 0.299 0.480 0.499 -0.418 -0.0708 0.524 
 
(0.408) (0.361) (0.401) (0.536) (0.483) (0.368) 
Backward FDI 1.843*** 2.332*** 1.434** 5.067*** 3.162*** 2.222*** 
 
(0.588) (0.725) (0.632) (0.966) (0.685) (0.745) 
Forward FDI 0.381 0.562 0.562 0.945** 0.0878 0.499 
 
(0.599) (0.560) (0.485) (0.362) (0.783) (0.581) 
WTO 0.133*** 0.308*** 0.0262*** 0.201*** 0.313*** 0.310*** 
 
(0.0316) (0.0236) (0.00503) (0.0327) (0.0297) (0.0236) 
Tariff*Horizontal FDI 0.0700 -0.0163 -0.0342 -0.0830 0.211 -0.0296 
 
(0.128) (0.138) (0.132) (0.122) (0.156) (0.140) 
Tariff*Backward FDI -0.423 -0.957** -0.210 -1.023*** -1.068* -0.916** 
 
(0.446) (0.382) (0.442) (0.238) (0.583) (0.384) 
Tariff*Forward FDI 0.0401 -0.139 -0.0820 -0.174 0.339 -0.101 
 
(0.303) (0.254) (0.238) (0.130) (0.405) (0.262) 
Constant 1.284*** 1.399*** 1.245*** 1.509*** 1.307*** 1.390*** 
 
(0.200) (0.0840) (0.187) (0.128) (0.208) (0.0844) 
       Observations 1,415,341 125,482 344,818 2,383 1,070,523 123,099 
R-squared 0.171 0.099 0.180 0.251 0.164 0.099 
 
Notes: All specifications include firm fixed effects and year dummies.  Robust standard errors clustered at sector level.  WTO is a dummy equal to 1 from 2002 
onwards.  Interaction terms are sectoral FDI measures interacted with tariffs.  Other controls also included from previous tables but not reported here (firm level 
FDI and SOE shares, input and final goods tariffs). 
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Table 7 Olley and Pakes Regressions for Grouped Data with Contemporaneous Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables and Tariff Controls: 
non-SOEs vs. SOEs (All firms, foreign-invested, and domestic firms with zero foreign investment 
 All Foreign-Invested Firms Domestic Firms 
  Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs 
horizontalS 0.347* 0.367** 0.268 -0.636 0.384 0.373** 
 
(0.206) (0.164) (0.195) (0.543) (0.247) (0.164) 
backwardS 1.287* 2.193*** 0.780 3.807*** 1.838** 2.115*** 
 
(0.701) (0.707) (0.564) (0.905) (0.908) (0.727) 
forwardS -0.0673 0.0322 0.0651 0.672** -0.0875 0.0513 
 
(0.323) (0.264) (0.253) (0.277) (0.399) (0.272) 
horizontalNS 0.520** 0.271* 0.547** -0.545 0.336 0.290* 
 
(0.228) (0.146) (0.221) (0.397) (0.289) (0.147) 
backwardNS 0.889 -0.991 1.931 2.949** -0.0909 -0.941 
 
(1.358) (0.864) (1.205) (1.327) (1.687) (0.864) 
forwardNS 1.030* 0.716* 0.803** 0.618*** 1.694** 0.741* 
 
(0.543) (0.385) (0.391) (0.218) (0.790) (0.394) 
Observations 1,415,341 125,482 344,818 2,383 1,070,523 123,099 
R-squared 0.172 0.098 0.182 0.239 0.164 0.098 
F-stat (HS=HNS) 0.67 0.23 2.27 0.09 0.03 0.16 
Prob>F 0.416 0.635 0.138 0.768 0.86 0.687 
F-stat (BS=BNS) 0.06 8.36 0.64 0.57 1.17 7.42 
Prob>F 0.81 0.005 0.427 0.454 0.284 0.008 
F-stat (FS=FNS) 1.71 1.23 1.44 0.05 2.41 1.21 
Prob>F 0.196 0.272 0.236 0.821 0.126 0.276 
F-stat (three conditions jointly) 2.11 4.29 3.24 0.2 1.58 3.9 
Prob>F 0.109 0.008 0.028 0.895 0.205 0.0131 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors at the sector level are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable for all regressions is lnTFP.  Controls 
included but not reported in the Table include the log of Final Tariffs and the log of input tariffs, as well as a WTO dummy equal to 1 after China entered 
the WTO.  All regressions include firm fixed effect and year dummy variables. HS = subsidized horizontal, and HNS = non-subsidized horizontal; BS = 
subsidized backward, and BNS = non-subsidized backward; FS = subsidized forward, and FNS = non-subsidized forward.  
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Table 8 Olley and Pakes Regressions for Grouped Data with Contemporaneous Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables (calculated based on 
value added tax) and Tariff Controls: non-SOEs vs. SOEs (all firms, foreign-invested, domestic firms) 
 
All firms Foreign-invested firms Domestic firms 
  non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs SOEs 
horizontalS 0.727** 0.856*** 0.590** -0.601 0.797* 0.892*** 
 
(0.303) (0.267) (0.236) (0.470) (0.454) (0.270) 
backwardS -0.690 0.533 -0.377 3.234*** -0.866 0.440 
 
(1.145) (0.961) (0.854) (1.069) (1.815) (0.991) 
forwardS 0.229 0.424* 0.499 0.669*** -0.0625 0.394* 
 
(0.425) (0.235) (0.349) (0.216) (0.490) (0.228) 
horizontalNS 0.275 0.299*** 0.267 -0.624 0.175 0.308*** 
 
(0.167) (0.112) (0.183) (0.530) (0.191) (0.112) 
backwardNS 1.813** 0.334 1.928** 3.195** 1.659 0.293 
 
(0.817) (0.664) (0.784) (1.309) (1.065) (0.668) 
forwardNS 0.485** 0.258 0.385** 0.676** 0.929*** 0.292 
 
(0.228) (0.179) (0.179) (0.285) (0.331) (0.187) 
Observations 1,222,322 116,138 298,385 2,308 923,937 113,830 
R-squared 0.184 0.105 0.203 0.228 0.170 0.104 
F-stat (HS=HNS) 3.44 4.71 4.1 0.01 2.54 4.9 
Prob>F 0.069 0.0341 0.0473 0.93 0.116 0.031 
F-stat (BS=BNS) 3.37 0.03 3.66 0 1.96 0.02 
Prob>F 0.0714 0.854 0.061 0.98 0.167 0.896 
F-stat (FS=FNS) 0.17 0.19 0.05 0 1.01 0.07 
Prob>F 0.683 0.663 0.817 0.98 0.21 0.786 
F-stat (three conditions jointly) 20.02 4.27 3.15 0 1.02 4 
Prob>F 0.121 0.009 0.031 0.99 3.884 0.012 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable for all regressions is lnTFP. All regressions include firm fixed 
effect and year dummy variables. Since the information on value added is missing for the year of 2004, we exclude the year of 2004 from regressions. HS = 
subsidized horizontal, and HNS = non-subsidized horizontal; BS = subsidized backward, and BNS = non-subsidized backward; FS = subsidized forward, 
and FNS = non-subsidized forward.  
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Table A-1. Summary of Estimated Coefficients on Input Variables using the Olley Pakes Two Stage Procedure 
 
All Enterprises Domestic, Private Establishments Only 
 
Labor Materials Capital 
 
Labor Materials Capital 
Foodstuffs 0.063648 0.795382 0.039528 
 
0.046787 0.846505 0.037731 
Manufacture of beverages 0.062011 0.797568 0.039427 
 
0.060272 0.783996 0.038303 
Manufacture of Tobacco 0.072545 0.793483 0.00697 
 
0.108622 0.699906 0.006198 
Manufacture of Textiles 0.057483 0.8192 0.041548 
 
0.047518 0.834871 0.048671 
Manufacture of textile wearing apparel, footwear 0.097813 0.706444 0.056324 
 
0.073357 0.742437 0.060367 
Manufacture of leather, fur, feather 0.082379 0.795421 0.043285 
 
0.065043 0.844919 0.042856 
Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo 0.056418 0.814447 0.041392 
 
0.041642 0.859254 0.039784 
Manufacture of furniture 0.110771 0.761009 0.050201 
 
0.10054 0.774004 0.053424 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.056664 0.808117 0.048015 
 
0.048811 0.812315 0.055325 
Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sports 0.109501 0.727006 0.033724 
 
0.067636 0.79291 0.02737 
Processing of petroleum, coking, nuclear fuel 0.10447 0.774527 0.0155 
 
0.092348 0.784275 0.005467 
Manufacture of raw chemical materials, chemical products 0.067949 0.790304 0.033636 
 
0.065466 0.792625 0.036906 
Manufacture of medicines 0.086851 0.762153 0.070223 
 
0.0884 0.763997 0.079882 
Manufacture of chemical fibers 0.053973 0.892586 0.035822 
 
0.065075 0.906072 0.018944 
Manufacture of Rubber 0.092509 0.718883 0.057499 
 
0.077012 0.723723 0.06136 
Manufacture of Plastics 0.126058 0.697807 0.038696 
 
0.106281 0.696002 0.054243 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 0.050259 0.814683 0.03636 
 
0.043229 0.821056 0.042961 
Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals 0.041025 0.862236 0.029997 
 
0.041844 0.863016 0.033199 
Smelting and pressing of metals 0.10535 0.750012 0.013021 
 
0.110405 0.73531 0.007556 
Manufacture of metal products 0.115651 0.683249 0.051367 
 
0.10836 0.6673 0.055312 
Manufacture of special purpose machinery 0.075696 0.786973 0.046593 
 
0.072163 0.806896 0.052035 
Manufacture of transport equipment 0.09118 0.792991 0.066821 
 
0.082191 0.814969 0.070575 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment 0.106034 0.774765 0.046943 
 
0.086655 0.796434 0.051404 
Manufacture of communication, computers and other electronic equipment 0.207143 0.70811 0.046657 
 
0.159348 0.729829 0.042883 
Manufacture of measuring instruments, machinery for cultural activity, office work 0.135264 0.726912 0.042837 
 
0.089397 0.764966 0.052725 
Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing 0.072451 0.778526 0.034818 
 
0.056781 0.804089 0.035706 
Total: Across All Sectors 0.085971 0.773345 0.043454 
 
0.071651 0.789283 0.047174 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3. Tax Rate Distribution with Groups of firms (2004) 
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Figure 4. Initial Tariffs and Subsequent Tariff Changes             
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